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The European Community Court:
Its Role in the Federalizing Process
The European Economic Communities may someday
provide the base for a united Europe. Professor Feld
examines the Court of Justice of the European Commu-
nities as an instrument of federalization. He finds evi-
dence in the Court's opinions of movement towards
establishment of a federal system.
Werner J. Feld*
INTRODUCTION
The dream of a European federation was articulated as far
back as the 1920's, yet today it is still very far from realization.
However, the first outline of such a federation may be seen in the
structure created by the treaties underlying the three European
Communities' - the Coal and Steel Community (ECSC),2 the
Economic Community (EEC),3 and the Atomic Energy Commu-
nity (Euratom).4 These treaties can be meaningfully compared to
the constitution of a state. They form the juridical basis for the
various Community agencies, delineate the relationships among
these agencies, and regulate the relationships between the three
Communities and the member states While the three Commu-
nities have been labeled a "functional" federation,6 the vice-presi-
*Professor of Government, Louisiana State University, New Orleans.
1. The signers of the three treaties are West Germany, France, Italy,
Belgium, the Netherlands, and Luxembourg.
2. Treaty Constituting the European Coal and Steel Community (1951)
[hereinafter cited as ECSC Treaty].
3. Treaty Establishing the European Economic Community (1957) [here-
inafter cited as EEC Treaty].
4. Treaty Establishing the European Atomic Energy Community (1957)
[hereinafter cited as Euratom Treaty].
5. The ECSC High Authority and the EEC and Euratom Commissions
are bodies independent of the member states. They are empowered on their
own, or in cooperation with the Council of Ministers, to issue regulations of
a quasi-legislative nature, and administrative decisions which are binding on
individuals and business enterprises in the member states.
6. 1 Sc HVARZENBGER, INTPrATioNAL LAw 344, 349, 354-55 (4th ed.
1960). Schwarzenberger's criteria for a "functional" federation are: elimination
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dent of the ECSC High Authority has expressed a more tradi-
tional view: "[T]he structure of the Communities presents some-
thing half-way between a true federal structure and the kind of
international cooperation we have seen in the past."7
Any appraisal of the nature of this structure requires more
than a legal analysis of the Community treaties, for it is insuf-
ficient to consider federalism merely in terms of a static pattern
of division of powers. Federalism should also be seen as "a process
by which a number of separate political organizations ... states
or any other kind of associations, enter into arrangements for
working out solutions, adopting joint policies, and making joint
decisions on joint problems."' In this process the possibility of
change in the pattern of shared values and beliefs and the extent
of common interests and objectives of the people in the entities
involved plays a significant role. If the autonomy of the entities is
not impaired by participation in the larger community, and if
the needs of the states are best served by community action, the
federalizing process is likely to proceed forward. According to
Professor Friedrich, the crucial factor for a progressive federalizing
of frontiers between states in economic, social, and certain technical fields;
the existence of organs with independent power to act extending beyond the
"deliberative and [the] consultative"; agencies with direct access to the citi-
zens of the member states.
Some of the organs of the Communities meet these qualifications. The
ECSC High Authority and the EEC and Euratom Commissions are independ-
ent of the member states. They have the power to issue on their own, or
in cooperation with the Council of Ministers, regulations of a quasi-legis-
lative nature as well as administrative decisions binding on individuals and
business enterprises in the member states. See ECSC Treaty arts. 9, 14, 92;
Euratom Treaty arts. 126, 161; EEC Treaty arts. 157, 189. Beginning in 1966
the functions of the High Authority and the two Commissions are to be
exercised by a unified body. See N.Y. Tunes, March 3, 1965, p. 1, col. 5.
Schwarzenberger's criteria resemble those formulated for the term
"supranationalism" by Professor Reuter. See REUTER, L& CommUNAuT
EURoPiENNE DU CHARBON BT DE LAcIR 188-40 (Paris, 1953). For other views
of the term "supranationalism," see H.&As, THE UNTInG OF EUROPE 9 (1958);
HALL.TEIN, UNITED EUROPE: CHALLENGE AND OPPORTUNITY 19-20 (1962);
cf. Lnwiiana, THE POLTICAL Dyw~zcs OF EURoPEAx EcONOm c INTEGRATION
4-9 (1963); Kunz, Su'a-National Organs, 42 Am. J. b 'L L. 690-98 (1959);
Robertson, Legal Problems of European Integration, 91 RECUEM. DES COURS DE
L'ACAnEmm in Dnorr INTERNATIONAL 105, 143-48 (1957).
7. Coppe, The Econoic and Political Problem of Integration, 26 LAw
& Con TEm. PRoB. 349, 358 (1961).
8. FRIEDRicH, INTENATIONAL FRLsm Dq THEORY AND PRACTICE IN
SYSTEMS oF INTEGRATiNG THE INTERNATioNAL COMmuNITY 117, 126-27
(Plischke ed. 1964).
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process is a workable community executive body existing apart
from the governments of the states. This body should become
the spearhead of federalization, usually aided, however, by an
arbitral or judicial tribunal of last resort. If the judgments of this
adjudicating agency have a centralizing tendency, the federalizing
process can be speeded;9 if they manifest a decentralizing
tendency, retardation of the process is probable.
The basic structure of the European Communities with its
executive and judicial organs obviously fits Friedrich's description
of a potentially successful federalizing process. This Article focuses
on the role of the Court of Justice of the European Communities
[hereinafter referred to as the Court], in the process of European
federalization. It shall examine the relevant functions and powers
of the Court as specified by the three treaties, and survey the
pertinent case law developed by the Court over the last twelve
years.
The Court is the direct successor of the Coal and Steel Com-
munity Court which functioned from 1952 until 1958 when the
EEC and Euratom came into being. Seven judges are chosen by
the governments of the member states for terms of six years. The
justices are assisted by two advocates-general who present im-
partial and independent conclusions on the disputes brought
before the court.10 Member states, organs of the Communities,
and private individuals and business enterprises affected by the
three treaties have access to the Court. Judgments are enforce-
able in the member states against private parties in the same
manner as judgments of national courts. However, judgments
against governments of member states can only be enforced under
the ECSC Treaty under certain conditions." The later Rome
Treaties have eliminated enforcement against member states. 2
I. CONTROVERSIES BETWEEN COMMUNITY ORGANS
AND GOVERNMENTS OF THE MEMBER STATES
The legal relationship between the Communities and the
9. See id. at 127-33, 145-47; FmEDRICH, FDEmmL CoNsTiTuTIoxALX
TrouRy A r EmRGENT PnoposA~is ni FsmuLI.: X&TuRE AND EMrnENT
510, 521-23 (Mac]ahon ed. 1962).
10. See generally FELD, THE COURT OF THE EUROPEAN Co n uNTIS: NEw
Dn&N- SroN i INTmxEATIONAL ADJUDICATION 2, 14-3 (1964). The institution
of the advocate-general is modded after the Commissaire du Gouvenement of
the French Couseil d'Etat.
11. See ECSC Treaty arts. 44, 88, 92.
12. See EEC Treaty arts. 187, 192; Euratom Treaty arts. 159, 164.
1966] 425
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member states best demonstrates the resemblance of the Com-
munities' structure to a federal system. Particularly, disputes
between Community agencies and member state governments
justifies viewing the Court's jurisdiction as "federal."
Such controversies often arise from allegations by the High
Authority and the EEC and Euratom Commissions that treaty
provisions have been violated. The High Authority and the Com-
missions have been endowed with certain powers to ensure fulfill-
ment of treaty obligations by the member states. The ECSC
Treaty requires the High Authority to notify the member state
of an alleged treaty violation, allowing time for compliance. The
state has the right to appeal to the Court which then rules on the
justification of the High Authority's allegation. If the appeal
fails or if no appeal is taken within two months, the High Au-
thority, acting jointly with the Council of Ministers, may invoke
certain economic sanctions against the offending state.'8
Under the Rome Treaties, the EEC and Euratom Commissions
must request a member state to meet its treaty obligations. Fail-
ure to comply within a set period allows the Commission to refer
the matter to the Court. If the Court finds a treaty violation, the
state government is merely obliged, as a signer of the treaty, to
implement the Court's judgment, because under the Rome
Treaties no economic sanctions are available to enforce judg-
ments. 4 This lack of enforcing power may be seen as undermining
the federalizing process. On the other hand, the prospect of offend-
ing public opinion may be a sufficient sanction. Furthermore, any
enforcement action in such a rudimentary federation might
arouse strong reactions in the offending state to the detriment of
the federalizing process.
In a number of instances member states have been charged
with violations of the ECSC and EEC Treaties. Although many
of these cases have been or are being settled, some disputes do
reach the Court. Two 1960 Court decisions grew out of High
Authority orders requiring member states to set public motor
freight rates. The Italian and Dutch governments refused to
acknowledge such an obligation and appealed to the Court. The
Court ruled that the High Authority lacked the power to make
13. See ECSC Treaty art. 88.
14. See EEC Treaty arts. 169, 171; Euratom Treaty arts. 141, 143. See also
EEC Treaty art. 225, which permits the Commission to appeal immediately
to the Court without first consulting the State concerned if the alleged treaty
violation has the effect of distorting conditions of competition in the Common
Market.
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the request. The national interests involved were thus accommo-
dated and the High Authority's efforts to eliminate discriminatory
freight rates within the Community -an avowed objective of
the ECSC Treaty -were weakened. 5
The High Authority's drawn out struggle to remove discrim-
inatory German freight rates applying to Ruhr coal going to
French steel plants was more successful. The Authority disallowed
some of the existing German rates, and at the same time permitted
the continuance of others for various reasons. The Court was
swamped with appeals against this decision. Basically the Court
upheld the High Authority 6 and the German government later
reconsidered its entire freight rate structure and introduced a
general low rate for coal applicable to both internal and inter-
national traffic.
Four later cases"7 brought by the EEC Commission against
member states for impeding the flow of goods across national
borders resulted in the Court declaring the actions of the member
15. See Gouvernement de la Rtpublique Italienne contre Haute Autorit6,
July 15, 1960, 6 Rec. de Ia Jurisprudence de la Cour [hereinafter cited as C.]
663; Gouvernement du Royaume des Pays-Bas contre Haute Autorit6, July
15, 1960, 6 C. 723. In view of the text of ECSC Treaty art. 70, § 31, this
decision is highly questionable. For a juridical base of the order to publish
freight rates the Court could also have resorted to the doctrine of "implied
powers" which it had developed in an earlier decision, FWd6ration Charbonni~re
de Belgique contre Haute Autorit6, November 29, 1956, 2 C. 199. The Court,
however, explicitly denied the applicability of that doctrine and in fact
retreated from the position it had taken in 1956. In a later decision the Court
recognized at least the right of the High Authority to "recommend" to the
member governments the publication of freight tariffs, Gouvernement du
Royaume des Pays-Bas contre Haute Autorit6, July 12, 1962, 8 C. 413. See
also Lmm, EUROPE'S COAL AND STEm CoMMuNiTY 374-76 (1960).
16. See Chambre Syndicale de ]a Sid6rurgie de l'Est de la France contre
Haute Autorit6, July 15, 1960, 6 C. 573; Barbara Erzbergbau Ag. et autres
contre Haute Autorit6, May 10, 1960, 6 C. 867; Gouvernement de la R6pub-
lique FRd~rale d'Allemagne contre Haute Autorith, March 8, 1960, 6 C. 117.
17. See Commission de la Communaut6 3conomique Europenne contre
Grand-Duch6 de Luxembourg et Royaume de Belgique, November 13, 1964,
10 C. 1217 (improperly high license fees for importation of certain products).
EEC Treaty arts. 12 & 31 prohibit the introduction of new customs duties and
other charges and restrictions after the treaty went into force January 1, 1958.
Commission de la Communaut6 Aconomique Europ~enne contre Grand-Duch6
de Luxembourg et Royaume de Belgique, December 14, 1962, 8 C. 813; Com-
mission de ]a Communaut6 Aconomique Europ6enne contre Gouvernement de
la R6publique Italienne, February 27, 1962, 8 C. 1 (applying improperly high
tariffs to radio parts); Commission de la CommunautW Aconomique Europ~enne
contre Gouvernement de ]a R6publique Italienne, December 19, 1961, 7 C.
633 (restricting importation of pigs and pork products).
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states to be violations of their treaty obligations. The govern-
ments involved complied promptly with the Court's rulings; as a
matter of fact, in the first case against Italy the import restrictions
were lifted before the Court pronounced its judgment.
There are two possible explanations why member states have
permitted such obvious violations of the EEC Treaty to reach
the Court. First, strong national interest groups may have
pressured a government into instituting measures protecting an
industry or commodity. Conceivably, the government may have
wished to make the trade restriction stick. However, the member
state may have shifted an unpopular decision to the community
structure to retain the good will of the pressure group. Second,
there may have been strong dissension within the national gov-
ernment in regard to a proposed protective measure. Instituting
the potentially violative measure may have been done to allow
the Court to act as the final arbiter. Whatever the reasons, this
apparently intentional shifting of final decision-making from the
state to the Community enhances the authority of the Commu-
nity structure as a whole and the authority of the Commission and
the Court in particular, and contributes significantly to the fed-
eralizing process.
Disputes over the relationship of the Communities to the
member states resulting from decisions of the High Authority or
the EEC Commission can also be brought before the Court by
the member governments.' 8 For example, Germany complained
about insufficient import quotas for oranges' 9 and raw materials
18. See ECSC Treaty arts. 33, 35; Euratom Treaty art. 148; EEC Treaty
arts. 173, 175. The specific grounds are legal incompetence, major violations
of procedure, infringement of the treaties or of any legal provision relating to
their application, and abuse of power (detournement de pouvoir). Under the
Rome Treaties a member state may also appeal to the Court against acts of
the Council of Ministers. ECSC Treaty art. 38 permits an appeal, although
more limited, for the annulment of a resolution of the European Parliamentor the Council of Ministers.
In addition, under ECSC Treaty art. 37 a member state may appeal to
the Court if a High Authority decision would provoke fundamental and
persistent disturbances in that state's economy. In the event of such an
appeal the Court possesses exceptionally broad powers to review the cogency
and expediency of the High Authority's decision. This provision establishes a
method for reconciling serious dashes of national and Community interests, a
proper task for any federal supreme court. See Niederrheinische Bergwerks-
Aktiengesellschaft Unternehmensverband des Aachener Steinkoblenbergbaues
contre Haute Autorit6, July 13, 1961, 7 C. 259, 288. See also EEC Treaty art.
226 which has a similar purpose but is much more restricted in its application.
19. See Gouvernement de ]a Ripublique FNd6rale d'Allemagne contre
Commission de ]a Communaut6 Aconomique Europ6enne, July 4, 1963, 9 C.
129.
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for the manufacture of brandy from countries outside the Com-
mon Market.20 In another case Italy asserted that the Commis-
sion had unduly impeded its export of refrigerators to France.2'
Although the Court sustained the German claim in the brandy
case, primarily on procedural grounds, the Commission's actions
were supported in the other two cases.
Admittedly, such decisions do not have great economic and
political significance. However, they do reveal acceptance of the
Court as a fair and equitable arbiter of conflicts involving national
economic interests. This confidence in the Community-level
decision making and arbitration mechanism does not mean that
other methods of attaining more important economic and political
objectives, such as direct interaction between member govern-
ments, have been discarded. But it appears that the Community
mechanism is presently being utilized to settle low-key economic
and political issues. Some decisions suggest a decentralizing
tendency because they tend to reduce the authority of the Com-
munity decision-making apparatus.F2 However, taken as a whole,
the Community apparatus is being strengthened, a centralizing
tendency is evident, and the long-run effect is a furthering of the
federalizing process.
Two judgments of the Court which were not rendered in
response to an appeal by one of the member governments throw
light on relations between member states and the Community.
In the first, a Dutch association of coal mining firms complained
the High Authority had refused to prohibit a German government
subsidy for German coal miners. The Court held the German
laws authorizing the payments were incompatible with the ECSC
Treaty, and thus the High authority should have taken steps to
20. See Gouvernement de ]a R publique FNd6rale d'Allemagne contre
Commission de ]a Communaut6 1conomique Europ6enne, July 15, 1963, 9 C.
269.
21. See Gouvernement de la R6publique Italienne contre Commission de
]a Communaut6 2conomique Europ~enne, July 17, 1963, 9 C. 335.
22. The prevailing of national interests over Community interests in anti-
trust regulation of the coal industry is an example. See Gouvernement du
Royaume des Pays-Bas contre Haute Autoriti, July 15, 1964, 10 C. 1047;
Comptoirs de Vente du Charbon de la Ruhr "Geitling," "Mausegatt" et
'Triisident" contre Haute Autorit6, May 18, 1962, 8 C. 165; Comptoirs de
Vente du Charbon de la Ruhr "Geitling," "Mausegatt" et 'Trasident" et
Soci6t~s Affilies contre Haute Autorit6, February 12, 1960, 6 C. 45. Other
examples are found in Gouvernement du Royaume des Pays-Bas contre
Haute Autorit6, March 21, 1955, 1 C. 201; Gouvernement de la I6publique
Frangaise contre Haute Autorith, December 21, 1954, 1 C. 7; Gouvernement
de ]a Rl6publique Italienne contre Haute Autorit6, December 21, 1954, 1 C.
73. See generally LIsTn, op. cit. supra note 15, at 259-70.
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prohibit the payments. The Court commented on the distinction
between powers of the Community and those "reserved" to the
member states:
The Community is founded on a common market, common objectives,
and common institutions .... Within the specific domain of the
Community, i.e. for everything which relates to the pursuit of the
common objectives within the common market, the institutions [of
the Community] are provided with an exclusive authority.
[O]utside of the domain of the Community, the governments of the
Member States retain their responsibilities and [powers] in all sectors
of economic policy .... They remain masters of their social policy;
the same undoubtedly holds true for large segments of their fiscal
policy.23
Germany later amended its laws to bring them into agreement
with the ECSC Treaty and the judgment of the Court. This action
illustrates the influence the Court can exert upon the social poli-
cies of the member states, although the Court recognizes the
states "remain masters of their social policy."
The second case dealt with a controversy between a member
government and a Community official. The problem was typical
of a federal system - whether a state could impose its income
tax on an official of the central government. 4 Civil servants of
the Communities are exempted from national taxes on salaries
paid to them by the Communities. 5 The wife of a Belgian ECSC
official had a separate, taxable income in Belgium. The Belgian
Internal Revenue Service requested the ECSC official to declare
his income from the Community so Belgian authorities could
determine the combined income of husband and wife for the
purpose of assessing the wife's tax. Although the dispute was
brought by a Belgian national against his government, the Court
declared itself competent to hear the case. The Court sustained
the official's claim, holding that no member state could take any
measure constituting a direct or indirect tax levy on salaries paid
by the Communities to its civil servants; Community salaries
could not even be used to determine the rate applicable to other
incomes. Although powerless to invalidate an administrative or
legislative act of a member state, the Court said such actions
23. De Gezamenijke Steenkolenmiinen in Limburg contre Haute Autorit6,
February 23, 1961, 7 C. 1, 43, 45.
24. The Court faced the basic problem in Jean-E. Humblet contre Atat
Beige, December 16, 1960, 6 C. 1125. Compare Graves v. New York ex rel.
O'Keefe, 306 U.S. 466 (1939).
25. See Euratom Treaty art. 192; Protocol on the Privileges and Immu-
nities of the European Economic Community art. 12.
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contravene Community law. The Court found the Belgian govern-
ment obligated under the ECSC Treaty" to abide by Court
decisions and thus duty bound to rectify the effects of its illegal
actions. The Belgian government complied with the Court's
decision.
I. CONTROVERSIES BETWEEN MEMBER STATES
Federal supreme courts are usually competent to decide public
law controversies between component units of the federation.
7
The three treaties grant the Community Court exclusive juris-
diction to hear and decide such disputes. 8 Therefore, no member
state can bring such a dispute to the International Court of
Justice at the Hague. In disputes involving private parties regard-
ing the application and interpretation of the treaties, the domestic
courts of the member states also remain competent. 9
Any dispute between member states which cannot be settled
by any other method provided by the ECSC Treaty, may be sub-
mitted to the Court by one of the parties?0 Such a general clause
was omitted in the Rome Treaties which allow member states to
bring an interstate dispute before the Court only after the alleged
treaty violation has been referred to the Commission. The Com-
mission involved must first ask the states concerned for com-
ments and then issue an official opinion.3
The Court may also be asked to arbitrate any dispute between
member states regarding the object or purpose of the treaties if
such a dispute is submitted under the terms of an arbitration
clauseP2 No preliminary proceedings of the Commission are then
required. However, arbitration of alleged treaty violations by a
member state is not available.
To date no member state has employed the provisions out-
lined in this section. Most conflicts of national interest between
member states have reached the Court through attacks on de-
cisions of the High Authority and the EEC Commission.
26. See ECSC Treaty art. 86; of. Euratom Treaty art. 192; EEC Treaty
art. 192.
27. See U.S. CoNsT. art. I, § 2; BAsic LAw oF THE FEDRmL RPmUBLIC
OF Gnmur y art. 93.
28. ECSC Treaty art. 87; Euratom Treaty art. 193; EEC Treaty art. 219;
cf. BEBRn, JuirncrL CommoL OF THE EUROPEAw CommUNITms 178-80 (1962).
29. See Euratom Treaty art. 155; EEC Treaty art. 188.
30. ECSC Treaty art. 89.
31. See Euratom Treaty art. 142; EEC Treaty art. 170.
82. ECSC Treaty art. 89; Euratom Treaty art. 154; EEC Treaty art. 182.
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I. UNIFORM INTERPRETATION OF
COMVIUNITY LAW
A federal supreme court must interpret the federal constitu-
tion. In carrying out this duty, the court will pass judgment on the
validity of federal and state legislation 3 3 The Community Court
may be considered as having comparable responsibilities with
respect to treaty interpretation, but its powers in regard to mem-
ber state laws are not as far reaching as those of a true federal
supreme court. Disputes involving the application and interpre-
tation of rules creating obligations on residents of member states
may be brought before either the Community or national courts2 4
Thus national courts may interpret the treaties underlying the
Communities.
In order to prevent six different interpretations and applica-
tions of the treaties, and the quasi-legislative and other acts85 of
the Communities, the Court has powers to ensure uniformity of
law. Under the ECSC Treaty, domestic courts must refer any
case in which the validity of an act by the High Authority or
Council is contested to the Court8 6 In other cases the domestic
courts may interpret, without restriction, the ECSC Treaty as
well as quasi-legislative and other acts of the organs of the Coal
and Steel Community. Under the Rome Treaties, domestic courts
of last resort must refer all cases which require interpretation of
33. See EEC Treaty arts. 100-02.
34. See Euratom Treaty art. 155; EEC Treaty art. 183. The ECSC
Treaty does not have a similar provision, but the legal situation is assumed to
be similar. See ECSC Treaty art. 41; BiBR, op. cit. supra note 28, at 178-79,
182-84.
35. Under the Rome Treaties "acts" may be "regulations," "decisions," or
"directives." "Regulations" resemble American statutes inasmuch as they are
binding on and directly applicable to private parties in the member states. A
"decision" binds only the addressee named therein. "Directives" are addressed
to and binding on member states only. See Euratom Treaty art. 161; EEC
Treaty art. 189. The ECSC Treaty distinguishes between "general" and "in-
dividual" decisions which are somewhat similar to the "regulations" and
"decisions" of the Rome Treaties. In addition, an "act" may also be a "recom-
mendation" which resembles the "directive" of the Rome Treaties except that
it may also be addressed to private parties who then will have the choice of
means for attaining the desired objectives. ECSC Treaty arts. 14, 33; BEBR,
op. cit. supra note 28, at 37-49.
36. See ECSC Treaty art. 41. This article speaks of "resolutions" of these
organs, but this term has been accepted as meaning the same as acts. See
BFBR, op. cit. supra note 28, at 182, 186. Chevallier, Le droit de la Com-
munautg Europienne et les Juridictiow Frangaises, 78 Ravun Du DRoIT PuBLiC
ET Da L& ScIENCE PoLITIQuE 646, 660 (1962).
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the treaties, or acts of Community agencies to the CourtL" Lower
courts may also request such "preliminary decisions." The de-
cision of the Community Court on the meaning of Community
rules or actions binds the domestic court s
The first request for a preliminary decision under the EEC
Treaty came from the Court of Appeals at The Hague (Nether-
lands) 9 and pertained to the interpretation of a treaty antitrust
regulation.40 The issue was whether a distribution agreement
restricting competition was null and void if in contravention of
the treaty's antitrust provisions.
The Court had three choices in this matter. First, it might
have taken a very strong anticartel position by literal acceptance
of the treaty language which states agreements prohibited by
the antitrust regulations are "null and void."41 Second, it could
have taken the rather weak view that prohibitions in the anti-
trust provisions merely pronounced general principles which re-
quired implementing regulations to become effective law. Third,
it could have assumed an intermediate stand and declared that
the antitrust prohibitions constituted immediately effective law,
empowering the Community and the member states to determine
the restrictive effects of the facts presented in each case. 2 The
Court adopted the last position. As a consequence, objectionable
agreements are not null and void ab initio, but are subject to an
evaluation by the authorities of the member states or the Com-
mission to determine whether they actually contravene the anti-
trust regulations of the treaty.
This judgment, commonly known as the Bosch decision, is one
of the landmarks in the Court's jurisprudence. Although the
decision did not give full effect to the antitrust provisions of the
treaty, it did meet the needs of many economic interest groups.
A more militant interpretation of the antitrust provisions would
have created many problems and a great deal of legal uncertainty.
Although the lives of a number of cartels were prolonged by the
37. See Euratom Treaty art. 150; EEC Treaty art. 177.
88. Ibid.
39. Demande de D6csion Pr6judicielle, SociRt6 Kledingverkoopbedrijf
de Geus en Uitdenbogerd contre 1) Soci6t6 de Droit Allemand Robert Bosch
GmbH 2) SociRt6 Anonyme Maatschappij tot Voortzetting van de Zaken der
Firma Willem Van Rijn, April 6, 1962, 8 C. 89, 115.
40. See EEC Treaty arts. 85-89.
41. See EEC Treaty art. 85(2).
42. The three positions have been labeled "positive law theory," "program
theory," and "power theory" respectively. See OBERnoRFmR, GI Iss & HmscB,
CoAoN irVMEART CAnrTEL LAw 86-87 (1963).
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decision, the Court insured legal stability in the Community-
a sine qua non for orderly implementation of the EEC Treaty.
A second preliminary decision of the Court was announced in
February of 1963. A Dutch administrative court of last resort
requested an interpretation of article 12 of the EEC Treaty. A
Dutch fim refused to pay import duties under a tariff which it
considered to be an increase over a previous tariff applied to the
same product. Despite strong objections by the Netherlands and
Belgium and the recommendations of the advocate-general, the
Court held in the Van Gend & Loos decision that article 12 was
directly applicable within the national law of member states, and
that it created a right for private parties enforceable in the do-
mestic courts. Declaring that the EEC Treaty was more than
an agreement creating mutual obligations between the contract-
ing states, the Court pointed out:
The Community constitutes a novel judicial order of international law,
in favor of which the States within certain areas have limited their
sovereign rights and of which the subjects are not only the State, but
also their citizens.... The Community law, independent of the legis-
lation of the States, is capable of creating rights which enter into the
legal system of the States.4"
This clear affirmation that certain treaty provisions create rights
and obligations for both individuals and governments enforceable
in national courts definitely has given impetus to the federalizing
process.
The Court's most significant preliminary decision was delivered
in 1964 in the case of M. Flamino Costa contre E.N.E.L. 5 This
eagerly awaited decision involved a serious conflict of opinion
between the Court and the Italian Constitutional Court. A
resident of Milan refused to pay his electric bill of slightly more
than three dollars, claiming the nationalization of the electric
utilities contravened certain articles of the EEC Treaty.46 The
matter was referred by the trial court to both the Community
Court and the Italian Constitutional Court.
The Italian court upheld the validity of the nationalization,
43. N. V. Algemene Transport-En Expeditie Onderneming Van Gend &
Loos contre Administration Fiscale N6erlandaise, February 5, 1963, 9 C. 1.
44. Id. at 23.
45. M. Flaminio Costa contre E.N.EJ,., uly 15, 1964, 10 C. 1141.
46. EEC Treaty arts. 37, 53, 93, 102 allegedly were violated. These articles
deal with member state obligations in connection with enactments of laws
likely to distort the Common Market, state aids, restrictions on the right of
establishment, and state monopolies.
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examining only the constitutional question of whether a law rati-
fying an international treaty which imposed certain restrictions
on Italy's sovereignty could be altered by a subsequent Italian
law changing these restrictions of national powers. Acknowledging
that the Italian Constitution specifically permitted such a limita-
tion of sovereignty, 47 the Italian court nevertheless gave prece-
dence to the subsequent nationalization over the law instituting
the EEC Treaty.4 The opinion did not inquire into alleged
treaty violations nor explore the legal nature of the treaty.
In the famous Costa decision, the Court of the European Com-
munities strongly disagreed with the views expressed in the Italian
decision:
Contrary to other international treaties, the Treaty instituting the
EEC has created its own legal order which was integrated with the
national order of the member states the moment the Treaty came into
force and which the domestic courts have to take into account; as such
it is binding upon them. In fact, by creating a -Community of unlimited
duration, having its own institutions, its own personality and its own
capacity in law, the right of international representation, and more
particularly, real powers resulting from a limitation of competence or
a transfer of duties from the states to the Community, the member
states, albeit within limited spheres, have restricted their sovereign
rights and created a body of law applicable both to their nationals and
to themselves. The integration, with the laws of each member state, of
provisions having a Community source.... have as their corrolary the
impossibility for the member states to give precedence to a unilateral
and subsequent measure which is inconsistent with . . . a legal order
accepted by them upon a basis of reciprocity.... [T]he rights created
by the Treaty by virtue of their specific original nature, cannot be
judicially contradicted by an internal law, . . . without undermining
the legal basis of the Community. [A] subsequent unilateral law,
incompatible with the concept of the Community, cannot prevail.49
47. See CONST. OF ITAJIAN REPUBLIC art. 11.
48. For a partial text of the judgment, see 2 CoMMoN IKET L. REV.
224-25 (1964). For an analysis of this decision by Nicola Catalano, former
Justice of the Court of the European Communities, see id. at 225-35.
49. Request for a Preliminary Decision by the Justice of Peace in Milan
in the case of M. Flaminio Costa contre E.N.E.L., July 15, 1964, 10 C. 1143,
1158-60. (Translated by author.) The basic notion underlying the statement
quoted was reaffirmed by the Court a few months later in Commission de la
Communaut6 t-conomique Europ6enne contre Grand-Duch6 de Luxembourg et
Royaume de Belgique, November 13, 1964, 10 C. 1217. The Court rejected the
argument by the governments of the two states that since the Commission had
failed to comply with certain of its own obligations resulting in unfavorable
consequences for Luxembourg and Belgium, the two governments were justified
in not fulfilling their obligations as well.
[Such a] relationship between the obligations of parties to the [EEC]
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The Court rejected the Italian argument that the Milan
judge's referral of the case to the Community Court was "abso-
lutely inadmissible" because a national court is bound to apply
only national law. It pointed out that its preliminary decision
"would not be given upon the validity of an. Italian law, but upon
the interpretation of ... [certain] articles ... in connection with
the problem raised by the Milan judge."' The Court also declared
that if national tribunals fail to protect a citizen's rights created
by Community treaties, the EEC Commission can charge the
member state with violating the treaty and bring the matter
before the Community Court.
This courageous decision of the Court reflects new thinking.
Instead of merely labeling the treaties a "novel judicial order of
international law" as it did in the Van Gend & Loos decision,"'
the Court spoke of a "legal order which was integrated with the
national order of the member states the moment the [EEC]
Treaty came into force ... ." The Court made it clear that rights
and obligations of nationals may arise directly or indirectly from
the treaties without action by the member states and that do-
mestic courts are required to observe and uphold these rights and
obligations.
Although constitutional objections to this decision are antici-
pated not only in Italy but elsewhere 52 there can be little question
Treaty cannot be recognized within the framework of Community law.
For the Treaty not only creates reciprocal obligations between the
different persons to whom it applies, but establishes a new legal order
which regulates the powers, rights and duties of such persons, as well
as the necessary procedure for determining and adjudicating upon any
possible violation thereof.
Consequently, in addition to the cases expressly covered by the
Treaty, its concept involves the prohibition on the part of members
from taking justice into their own hands.
Id. at 1282.
50. M. Flaminlo Costa contre E.N.E.L., supra note 49, at 1158.
51. See text accompanying notes 43-44.
52. See Eble, Verfassungskontrolle und Gemeinschaftsrecht, 17 NEuE
JmuisTscim WocHENscHRwT 321-27 (1964); Ipsen & Nicolaysen, Euro-
paeisches Gemeimnschaftsrecht, 17 Nnu" JmiTmscHm WocmmscHmr 339-44
(1964). See also Jaenicke, Das Verhaeltnis zwischen Gemeinschaftsrecht und
natonlen Recht in der Agrarmarkt-organisation der Europaeischen Wirt-
schaftsgemenschaft, 28 ZErrscmuFT FR AU5LARNIscHES OEFFENTLICHES
RE HT uND VELxERREcHT, 485-535 (1963). "Barley Case" decided by the
Court of Finance of Rheinland-Pfalz on November 14, 1963, abbreviated ver-
sion in 1 COMMON MARKET L. REv. 463-65 (1964). The Court of Finance held
that the German law ratifying the EEC Treaty was invalid because it violated
the principle of separation of powers laid down in the Basic Law. The case
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the Costa decision has a strong centralizing tendency and will
become an active agent in the Community federalizing process.
The pattern of preliminary ruling referrals from domestic tribu-
nals to the Court is also significant. 3 After Bosch, an increasing
number of domestic courts began to request preliminary decision.
National courts in all states except Belgium have now asked the
Court to render authoritative interpretations of Community law
in cases before them. However, the bold spirit of integration
which characterized the Costa and the Van Gend & Loos decisions
is lacking in these other rulings.54
The growing number of requests for preliminary rulings sug-
gests a rising confidence, certainly among the judiciary, and per-
haps among people in general, in the Court as the final interpreter
of Community law. The Court's increasingly frequent exercise of
this function will continue to be an operative factor in the federal-
izing process. But some domestic courts are reluctant to make
referrals, even when obligated to do s0 5 Some of these courts
justify their refusal by finding Community law irrelevant to the
decision. Other decisions eliminate Community law by "inter-
preting it away." 56 The Court has no power to compel a referral;
has been referred to the German Federal Constitutional Court for review. For
a recent German reaction to the Costa decision, see Ehle, Verhaeltnis des
Europaeischen Gemeinschaftsrechts zum natonalen Recht, 17 NEUB JuRs-
TISCHE WOCHENsOcimFT 2331-38 (1964).
53. See BEBR, op. cit. supra note 28, at 195-97, listing a number of cases
where German and Dutch courts did not request a preliminary decision from
the Court although they were obviously required to do so under the terms of
the EEC Treaty.
54. See, e.g., Request for a Preliminary Decision by the Administrative
Tribunal of Frankfurt M. in the case of Deutschmann contre Ripublique
Fdd6rale d'Allemagne, July 8, 1965, 11 C. 601; Request for a Preliminary De-
cision by the Civil Tribunal in Rome in the case of SA.RL. Albatros contre
Soci6t6 des P6troles et des Combustibles Liquides (Sop6co), February 4, 1965,
11 C. 2. The judgments in Albatros, and Deutschmann, indicate that the
Court is exercising great caution not to encroach on the sovereignty of
the member states, and not to assess the validity of national legislation and
administrative regulations.
55. See, e.g., Constructa Werke GmbH v. De Geus en Uitdenbogerd,
Netherlands Supreme Court, April 10, 1964; Nicolas and Soc. laison Brandt
Freres, Court of Appeals, Amiens, May 9, 1963; Poultry Meat case, Court of
Finance of Nuernberg, April 23, 1963. For abbreviated English versions of
these decisions with annotations see 2 ComoN ARKET L. Rxv. 100-01
(1964); 1 CosMoN MARKET L. REv. 359-64 (1963).
56. Of. Hay, Federal Jurisdiction of the Common Market Court, 12
Am. J. CoMnP. L. 21, 31 (1963). Hay points out that as long as a case can be
decided on independent "state law grounds," the failure to apply Community
law is justified as it is under the federal law of the United States. Cf. NAACP
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for the sake of uniformity, hopefully some means will be found to
ensure compliance with the referral provisions. Because Treaty
revision in the near future is unlikely, parallel legislation in the
member states might be necessary to solve the problem."r
IV. ADVISORY OPINIONS OF A
CONSTITUTIONAL NATURE
Federal supreme courts do not normally issue advisory opin-
ions.65 However, there seems no reason inherent in the federal
system to prevent authorizing a supreme court to give advisory
opinions under certain circumstances. Seemingly this would enable
the court to execute its primary function: definition of the limits
of power of the central government and its component units.50 9
The Court may render advisory opinions in a number of cir-
cumscribed situations. The most important of these areas con-
cerns revision of the ECSC Treaty.P0 While agreement by the
member states is a prerequisite to major ECSC Treaty revisions,
the community organs have a strictly limited revision power
which must be exercised under the control of the Court.6 '
To initiate a "small revision,"'62 the High Authority makes a
v. Alabama, 357 U.S. 449 (1958); Fox Film Corp. v. Muller, 296 U.S. 207
(1985).
57. See Hay, supra note 56, at 40.
58. The West German Federal Constitutional Court was initially em-
powered to render such opinions, but this authority was withdrawn in 1956.
See LisCKE, CoN mm oARY GovmuamNT or Gmurwr 129-31 (1962).
59. Cf. WHBAnx, FEDERAL GovmxAwT 65-66 (3d ed. 1953).
60. See ECSC Treaty art. 95. The EEC and Euratom Treaties may be
revised or amended only -by the governments of the member states, a procedure
in which the Court does not participate at all. See Euratom Treaty art. 286;
EEC Treaty art. 236.
61. ECSC Treaty art. 95.
62. A "small revision" can be carried out only in the event of unforeseen
difficulties in the application of the treaty or in the case of a profound change
in the economic and technical conditions directly affecting the Common Market
for coal and steel. Given the existence of these conditions the revision can
only deal with a modification of the rules governing the exercise of the power
of the High Authority necessary to remedy the unforeseen difficulties or coun-
teract the effects of the changed economic and technical conditions. Moreover,
the revision must not alter or infringe on the basic objectives of the treaty.
Also, it must not result in an alteration of the existing relationship between
the powers of the High Authority and those of the other organs of the Com-
munity. See generally Carstens, Die Kleine Revision des Vertrages iiber die
Gemeinschaft fir Kohle und Staid, 21 ZITSCmm-T YRu AUSIAENDiscHS
)FFEN-ricHEs RECHT uND VLKmEumECHT 1-37 (1961).
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revision proposal. If supported by five-sixths of the Council, both
organs jointly submit the proposed revision to the Court. If the
Court finds the proposed revision within the power of the Com-
munity agencies and justified by existing conditions, the revision
proposal is submitted to the European Parliament for final ap-
proval. Approval by the Parliament makes the revision binding
on the member states without ratification.
The Court has taken its responsibility of examining the "con-
stitutionality" of proposals for small ECSC Treaty revisions very
seriously. The first revision to come before the Court sought to
give the High Authority increased powers to grant assistance to
individual coal mines0 In a very thorough opinion the Court
found the proposed revision unacceptable, primarily because it
feared the equilibrium of powers envisaged by the treaty was
likely to be disturbed since the proposed new powers applied to
the coal but not the steel industry.64 The proposal was revised in
accordance with the decision and was then approved by the Court
as modified6 The Court also rejected a proposed revision of the
treaty's antitrust provisions."
The Court's authority to examine the "constitutionality" of a
proposed treaty revision is actually more than a mere veto power
since the Court can suggest the general outlines of an acceptable
revision in its opinion.67 These opinions illustrate the Court's
strong concern for maintenance of the balance of powers at the
Community level. They also demonstrate a reluctance to permit
revisions which tend toward decentralization.
The Rome Treaties allow the Court to render advisory opinions
concerning external relations of the Communities. The EEC, as a
legal personality and a subject of international law, is authorized
to conclude certain international agreements with other states
and international organizationsP8 Once concluded, these agree-
ments are binding on the Community and the member states. In
view of the far-reaching consequences of such agreements, the
Council, the Commission, or a member state may request the
Court's opinion on the compatibility of the proposed agreement
with the treaty. If the Court issues a negative opinion, the agree-
ment cannot enter into force.
63. See Avis imis par Ia Cour de Justice, December 17, 1959, 5 C. 551.
64. Id. at 555-62.
65. Avis de Ia Cour, March 4, 1960, 6 C. 107.
66. Avis de Ia Cour, December 13, 1961, 7 C. 505, 514.
67. See BEBr, op. cit. supra note 26, at 161, 162.
68. See, e.g., EEC Treaty arts. 114, 228, 238.
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Euratom may also conclude agreements with third party states
and international organizations, but the treaty does not provide
for preliminary control by the Court. The reason for this difference
may be that Euratom agreements do not directly bind the mem-
ber states.0 9 However, the Court may be asked to issue an ad-
visory opinion on the compatibility of an international agreement
which a member state intends to conclude with a third country
with the Euratom Treaty. If the Commission raises objections
to the contemplated agreement, the member state may either meet
the Commission's objections or petition the Court for a ruling as
to the compatibility of the proposed draft with the treaty. If the
member state loses, it cannot conclude the agreement unless it is
modified in compliance with the Court's opinion.7
Clearly the Court's authority to issue advisory opinions under
the EEC and Euratom Treaties places it in a strategic position to
influence the external relations of the two Communities. In view
of the increasing responsibilities which the Community organs
have for the conduct of external relations, 71 the Court's authority
is a necessary safeguard for the transfer of selected external
powers from the member states to the Communities. Since the
foreign relations of a federation are usually controlled by the
central government, 72 this authority to render advisory opinions
with respect to the external relations of the EEC and Euratom has
potential significance for the federalizing process in the Commu-
nity.
V. CONCLUSION
The jurisdictional powers of a constitutional nature assigned
to the Court of the European Communities by the Treaties of
Paris and Rome strongly suggest a judicial position similar to a
supreme court in a federation. Many of these powers have been
exercised in response to increasing requests by organs of the Coin-
unities, governments of the member states, and national courts.
From its inception in 1952 until July 1965, the Court has rendered
more than 150 decisions and opinions - thirty-three involving
69. Euratom Treaty art. 206.
70. See Euratom Treaty arts. 103-05.
71. Of. Euratom Treaty arts. 101-06; EEC Treaty arts. 111-16.
72. See WnnAmR, op. cit. 8upra note 59, at 178-96.
73. This is an impressive record for a multinational court, especially if
compared with an international tribunal of the traditional order such as the
International Court of Justice which has rendered less than 50 judgments in
its twenty years of existence.
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disputes or questions typical of issues which might be decided by
a federal supreme court. Of these thirty-three decisions, sixteen
dealt with controversies between Community organs and mem-
ber states. Many of the sixteen controversies involved major
conflicts of national economic interests. Fourteen of the 150
decisions were preliminary rulings requested by domestic courts
interpreting the Community law. Three were advisory opinions.
Without question, the Van Gend & Loos and the Costa decis-
ions have made the greatest contribution to furthering federaliza-
tion. They have defined the Community legal system as a super-
structure that must be accorded precedence over the legal systems
of the member states. These decisions, as well as others settling
disputes between Community organs and member states or pro-
nouncing final interpretations of Community law, have also given
impetus to the federalizing process by underscoring the predomi-
nance of the Community-level decision making process. Finally,
the continued compliance by member governments with adverse
judgments of the Court, the rising number of requests for pre-
liminary rulings by national courts, and the increasing number of
appeals in general,74 permit two inferences. First, the prestige of
and the confidence in the Court among member governments and
possibly even among the people is high; and second, the Court is
accepted as meeting some of the expectations and needs of the
people in the Community and is enhancing a number of their
interests.75
It is difficult to measure the impact of a high court's activities
on the beliefs and attitudes of the people under its jurisdiction.
Nevertheless, it is reasonable to assume that as the Court meets
the needs and expectations of important interest groups and in-
dividuals it will develop attitudes favorable to the emergence of
a federal system in which it might become the supreme judicial
body. Conversely, if its judgments do not satisfy these needs and
expectations, the federalizing process will be retarded. 7 6
Looking at the Court's contribution to the federalizing process
strictly in terms of Professor Friedrich's criterion of whether the
74. In 1963 the Court rendered 19 judgments and in 1964, the number ofjudgments rose to 27. A large number of suits are still pending at the present
time.
75. In this connection it is also significant that large numbers of civil
servants have petitioned the Court for the relief of grievances. Cf. Feld, The
Civil Service of the European Communities: Legal and Political Aspects,
12 J. PuB. L. 68 (1963).
76. See the comments on functional jurisprudence and law in HAAs,
BEYoND THE NATIoN-STATE 40-47, 490-91 (1964).
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judgments have a centralizing or decentralizing tendency, it
would seem the majority of the judgments have had a centralizing
tendency. Thus the Community Court has done its part in fur-
thering the federalizing process in the European Community. Of
course, as Friedrich points out, the main burden for setting this
process in motion and maintaining its movement lies with the
central executive and not with the judiciary.77 Furthermore, the
executive's role in the Community is likely to be enhanced by the
prospective fusion of the High Authority and the two Commis-
sions into a single agency in 1966.7s But even a politically astute
and enthusiastic executive may have little success in furthering
the federalizing process if powerful political factors outside its
control- for example, strong political opposition in one of the
component entities - work persistently against the process.
77. FREDliCH, INTEnNATIONAL FEDERALISm iN THEORY AND PRAcTIcE iN
SvsrTms oF INTEGRATim THE IN ATioNAL Co mvnurT 145-46 (Plischke
ed. 1964).
78. See N.Y. Times, March 8, 1965, p. 1, col. 5. It should be noted the
merger of the three bodies does not mean that the three treaties are also
fused into one treaty. Rather, similar to the Council of Ministers, the unified
executive will exercise its functions in accordance with the treaty which
applies to the subject matter under consideration. For example, if the execu-
tive should deal with a coal or steel matter, the provisions of the ECSC
Treaty will govern its actions.
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